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China in Islam: Turki Views from the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 
 
Rian Thum, Loyola University New Orleans 
 
Abstract 
 
This article questions dominant understandings of “China,” “Islam,” and the relationship 
between the two. It does so by uncovering an alternative understanding of China, one held by a 
group of people living within the Qing Empire and, later, the Republic of China: the Turki-
speaking Muslims of Altishahr, known today as Uyghurs. Turki manuscript sources depict China 
as a distant and distasteful power, as a khanate in the Inner Asian tradition, and as a city 
synonymous with its ruler, characterized above all else by its rejection of Islam, yet vulnerable to 
conversion by charismatic Sufis. This notion of China, it is argued, is no more culturally 
determined than the predominant understanding of China that undergirds most scholarly studies 
of China, and no less enlightening. And yet Altishahri and other Islamic perspectives have been 
excluded from our notion of China, largely through a dependence on the concept of “syncretism.” 
As an alternative to the syncretism approach to cultural interchange, the article advocates for a 
greater focus on overlapping networks of shared meaning. Applied to the Altishahri case, this 
approach gives a sense of what is lost in the privileging of Islam and China as dominant 
categories, and shows the distortions involved in bounding these categories. 
 
Keywords: Islam, China, syncretism, Uyghur 
 
Scholars have long recognized that the notion of “China” is a culturally specific construction, 
and yet it seems impossible to escape the Chinese construction of China. The problems with the 
predominant construction of “China” are exacerbated by the fact that it reflects the ideology of a 
conquering state at the expense of dominated groups like the Tibetans and Altishahris. This 
article questions the dominant essentialization of China by examining China from the perspective 
of one of its conquered populations: the people of Altishahr. Chronologically, it focuses on the 
nineteenth century and the first three decades of the twentieth century, an era when manuscripts 
were produced and used in large numbers. 
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The Altishahris discussed here were Turki-speaking, sedentary Muslim inhabitants of the 
region they knew as Altishahr (also known as Eastern Turkestan, Chinese Turkestan, Kashgaria, 
or Xinjiang Nanlu), which came under China-based control in 1759. Since the 1930s, the 
Altishahri identity has been transformed into a “Uyghur” ethnonational identity roughly 
contiguous with its Altishahri predecessor, and it is under the Uyghur name that the Altishahris’ 
descendants are known today. 
The Altishahri/Uyghur cultural complex has never been granted the status of 
civilizational center by outsiders. Among non-Uyghur scholars today, it tends to be defined as 
marginal from two perspectives. For Sinologists the Altishahri story fits into “frontier studies,” 
and for Islamicists it falls into the category of “Islam at the margins.” Of course, like most 
communities, the Uyghurs and their ancestors did not consider themselves to be marginal in the 
least, and this self-understanding led them to develop constructions of China that relegated it to 
the status of a powerful but ultimately distasteful other. I argue below that the distinctive 
characteristics of this understanding reflect both particularly Altishahri cultural traits and 
Altishahr’s participation in wider networks of cultural significance, including the larger Islamic 
world, Central Asian Sufi networks, the sphere of Inner Asian political legitimacy, and Indo-
Persian narrative traditions. 
This view of overlapping networks of meaning challenges some of the conceptual 
underpinnings of the field of “Islam in China,” in particular the clean compartmentalization of 
Islam and China, along with models of “syncretism” predicated on such compartmentalization. 
Compartmentalization is foundational to syncretism models, because the idea of mixing religions 
postulates ideal unmixed forms, deceptively clean units like true (nonsyncretic) Islam or true 
Daoism. Syncretism has, of course, been criticized on these grounds before, in relation to other 
traditions (e.g., Martin 1996), and its usefulness has even been challenged from within the field 
of Islam in China (Gladney 1987, 501). However, this brand of essentializing syncretism has 
survived as a foundational concept in both Chinese- and English-language scholarship (e.g., 
Lipman 1998; Israeli 2002; Frankel 2011; Hai 2013). The example of Altishahri notions of China 
points up some of the particular distortions this has created for our understandings of China and 
Islam. 
I have attempted to make sense of the idiosyncrasies of Altishahri views of China not by 
imagining “influences,” or unidirectional, one-time transfers of meaning between stable cultural 
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units or identity groups, but instead by tracing the many overlapping regional and global 
communities of shared cultural meanings (“networks of significance,” “networks of meaning”) 
of which most Altishahris were members. As the nuances of Altishahr’s China are unraveled, it 
becomes clear that Altishahris have tapped a wide variety of networks of significance and 
exchange to understand their strange neighbor, not limiting themselves to the networks we are 
most comfortable with (religion: Islam, state: Qing/China, ethnic group: Altishahri). In addition 
to these obvious networks, Inner Asian networks of political legitimacy, Indo-Persian literary 
culture, transregional Sufi preaching networks, and local networks of pilgrimage and historical 
practice have shaped Altishahri visions of China, and through these visions, the interactions 
between the Chinese state and Central Asian Muslims. These conclusions give a sense of what is 
lost in the privileging of Islam and China as dominant categories, and show the distortions 
involved in bounding these categories. 
 
Two Chinas 
 There is a terminological divide in the manuscripts of nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century Altishahr. On one hand, those that are derived from earlier sources speak frequently of 
“Chīn and Māchīn” (hereafter, Chin and Machin), employing medieval Perso-Arabic 
terminology for the eastern half of Altishahr, in particular the region of Khotan, or for China 
proper. On the other hand, among the texts composed under Qing rule, the few that refer to the 
Qing Empire or the Republic of China do so by the terms “Khiṭāy,” “Chīn,” “Chīn city,” “Bijīn,” 
or “people of Bijīn” (hereafter, Khitay, Chin, and Bijin). This latter group of terms, by virtue of 
its continued use throughout the first half of the twentieth century, portrays the Qing Empire and 
the Republic of China as essentially the same entity.1 The present essay will introduce the older 
“Chin and Machin” concept briefly, before undertaking a more thorough analysis of the later 
Khitay/Chin/Bijin cluster of terms. 
 “Chin and Machin” appears frequently in the most popular of Altishahr’s historical 
genres, the taẕkirah, or local hagiography. In particular, it is a staple concept in a group of 
taẕkirahs that describe the spread of Islam into Altishahr through holy wars. Internal evidence 
suggests that these texts are descended from oral epics, many narrating the Qarakhanid conquests 
of Altishahr in the tenth and eleventh centuries C.E. The identification of Chin and Machin 
(usually, but not always, used together) with the Altishahri oasis of Khotan is clear in most cases 
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from context, and in at least one case from an explanatory statement in the text; a manuscript of 
the Taẕkirah-i Imām Ja‘far Ṭayarān reads, “When the four sacrificed imams came to Imam 
Ṭayarān’s resting place from Mavarannahr, making the various cities of Kashgar, Yarkand, and 
Chin and Machin—that is to say [ya‘ni] Khotan—Islamic…” (BaJT, f. 32a). Occasionally, 
Machin is used individually to denote Khotan, as in one manuscript of the Taẕkirah-i Türt Imām 
Ẕabiḥlar, which uses “Machin city” (LuT2, f. 173a) where another recension of the same text has 
“Khotan city.” (LuTI, f. 58a). The Altishahri understanding of Chin and Machin is roughly in 
line with the use of these names in earlier Persian texts, except that the Persian texts are more 
likely to distinguish between the two, associating Machin with the area around Khotan (as in 
LuT2) and Chin with a larger kingdom to the east (e.g., Firdawsī 1906, 256, 370). 
 A representative passage from The Taẕkīrah of Imam Mūsá Kāzīm [sic] demonstrates the 
role of Chin and Machin in the holy war narratives: 
 
His grandfather said, “Oh Imam, Chin and Machin is without religion of any kind. 
They will oppress you. Do not go now.” The imam did not agree and…he arrived 
at the region of Chin and Machin. His companions said, “Oh Imam, the ruler of 
this region is Malik Muz̤affar, son of Toqqūz Khaqan. He is a faithless kāfir. Your 
noble father and Imam Ja‘far Ṣādiq found martyrdom at his hands.” (SpMK, ff. 
51b–52a) 
 
As in all of the holy war taẕkirahs, Chin and Machin is significant as a land of unbelief, whose 
inhabitants are known only as kāfirs (infidels), and as the site of martyrdom for the saints who 
lent their names to the various taẕkirahs. Like other taẕkirahs, these holy war tales were read 
aloud to pilgrims at the tombs of the saints described within them (Thum 2012). That is to say, 
the tales were performed in the very places described as Chin and Machin, teaching listeners that 
they were the new inhabitants of the land once known as Chin and Machin, a land that by their 
own time had been renamed as Khotan and converted to Islam. This understanding remains 
common in Khotan today, especially among people who frequent the local shrines, and I have 
often been told that the remains of ancient Chin and Machin can be found in the nearby desert. 
For the most part, the distinction between the earlier “Chin and Machin” usage and the 
later “Khitay/Chin/Bijin” cluster of terms was clear in the texts that deployed them. The content 
and context of Altishahri texts left no doubt as to whether they were discussing pre-Islamic 
Khotan or contemporary Qing/Republican China. In most cases the terminology aligned neatly 
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with this conceptual divide. However, this was not always the case; the word “Chin” was 
sometimes used alone to refer to Khotan.2 This created semantic overlap of the terminology for 
Qing/Republican China with the terminology for the Buddhist kingdom of Khotan that predated 
the Qarakhanid conquest. This overlap will be treated again below, following an analysis of 
Altishahri concepts of the Qing Empire and Republican China. 
 
Hidden China 
 The most remarkable aspect of Altishahri depictions of Qing and Republican China is 
their rarity. For the century following the Qing conquest (1759), the China-based domination of 
Altishahr was elided in the vast majority of manuscript texts. This omission was temporarily 
addressed in the wake of the Muslim rebellions of 1864–1877, which led to the establishment of 
the Emirate of Kashgar and inspired a flood of new writing on local history. These new historical 
works were concerned primarily with the events of the rebellion itself, and therefore, by 
necessity, dealt with China in an explicit way. Yet the new histories received little attention from 
ordinary readers, and they were never copied in great numbers. Thus, for most readers the textual 
silence regarding China persisted until the next revolution, when, in 1933, the newspaper of the 
independent Republic of East Turkestan began to treat the relationship between Altishahr and 
China again. 
 The general silence on China in the Altishahri literary tradition was encouraged by the 
Qing strategy of indirect rule and Qing disinterest in integrating Xinjiang, the “new dominion,” 
with interior China. A large force of primarily Manchu soldiers was split between Ili and 
Kashgar, but the day-to-day governing was carried out by Altishahri officials, who staffed a 
structure very similar to that which had preceded Qing rule. The highest level of Altishahri 
officials, and the only ones who had to deal directly with Manchu or Chinese superiors, were the 
begs, elites from families that had cooperated with the Qing during the conquest. These 
individuals were entrusted with the governing of entire oases. Because the Altishahri political 
tradition regarded non-Muslim rule as illegitimate, begs often presented themselves to their 
subjects as supreme rulers, making no mention of their Manchu overlords. Thus, for example, a 
Persian inscription commissioned by the beg of Yarkand, commemorating his renovation of an 
important shrine, called him 
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the sultan who traverses the clime of integrity, chief among the rulers of the 
citadel of majesty, friend of the ‘ulamā and the pious, patron of the poor and the 
indigent, glory of the world and the religion, defender of Islam and the Muslims, 
promoter of the shari‘at and devotee of justice, the plenipotentiary amir, ḥākim of 
Yarkand Yūnus Ḥākim Beglik, son of Iskandar Wang Beglik, son of Emin 
Khwāja Wang Beglik. May God make his life and kingdom everlasting and 
increase his sultanate and his glory!3 
 
Meanwhile, Yūnus’s overlord, the non-Muslim Qing emperor, went unmentioned entirely. 
Chinese immigration to Altishahr also had a limited impact. For the first half of Qing 
domination, immigration from the interior of China was discouraged, although criminals were 
often exiled to the Ili valley. In the ensuing century and a half, a growing number of Chinese-
speaking immigrants engaged in inter-oasis trade, but their numbers remained small. Immigrants 
lived in special segregated quarters in major towns. Visitors’ descriptions and photos show that 
apart from the immigrants’ quarters in major cities, the population was strikingly homogeneous, 
consisting almost entirely of Altishahri people. For all these reasons, most Altishahri people, 
especially those in rural areas, had very limited contact with representatives of the government or 
culture of “China.” There was rarely occasion in everyday life to imagine China. 
 
Mentions of Qing and Republican China 
 Rare though it was, mention of Qing and Republican China did appear in the works of a 
few Altishahri authors. There is not space here for a transcript of all textual Altishahri references 
to China, though such an anthology would probably occupy no more than several dozen pages. 
Instead, I present the first appearance of China in each of those texts I have accessed that treat 
the subject.4 The picture that emerges is representative of both the variety of terminology and the 
consistency of certain features throughout and across the texts. These selections use the most 
common terms for the emperor of China (khaqan, khan, great khan) and the most common terms 
for China (Khitay, Chin, Bijin). 
Of the texts presented here, only the first seems to have achieved any popularity. It is a 
hagiography of three Naqshbandi saints: Āfāq Khvāja (hereafter, Afaq Khoja), his son, and his 
father, Muḥammad Yūsuf (also known as Mazār Pādishāhim), whose proselytizing missions 
supposedly took him to China. The popularity of the text is due in part to its association with the 
tomb of Afaq Khoja, a major pilgrimage site in Kashgar. The remaining texts did not circulate 
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widely, but they are important for their documentation of the authors’ views on China. Text 2 is 
a rare verse account of the 1864 uprising against Qing rule in Ili, which was printed in Kazan. 
Selections 3 and 4 are from short manuscript texts commissioned by a Swedish missionary, 
Gustav Raquette, probably to provide material for his dictionary of the Turki language. Text 5 is 
a history of Altishahr with a focus on the uprisings of 1864 and the period of independence that 
followed. The final text is a unique, untitled continuation of text 5 by another author. 
 
1) Then, being finished, [Muḥammad Yūsuf] wished to go to [the?] khaqan of Chin. Then 
he went to Sukhur [Tibet, treated here as a part of the khaqan’s territories]. And then in 
the end the people [who followed him] were numerous. At this time Khitay received an 
attack from the Qalmaqs. 
—Anonymous, Taẕkirah-i of Ᾱfāq Khvājah [Biography of Afaq Khoja], middle of 
the nineteenth century (LuAK f. 11r) 
 
2) When the time of the khan called Chen Long was reached, 
Uprooted people came to the city of Ili 
From Kuchar and Aqsu, Shayar, and Bay, 
And Yarkand, Kashgar, and Khotan, 
All kinds of people moved to Ili, 
And set up villages and tilled the earth. 
From that moment to this moment a hundred-something years, 
In service of the khaqan so many years. 
The infidel oppressed and tyrannized the believers, 
Taking barley, wheat, corn, and money. 
The infidels’ tyranny exceeded the limit, enough! 
From Khitay the people saw hardships, enough! 
 —Mullā Bilāl, Ghazāt dar mulk-i Chīn [Holy war in China], (1880–1881, 9) 
 
3) That which is called changchile [theatrical performance] has been a custom among the 
idolaters of the region of the khaqan, and it is similar to the custom of the Muslims’ 
“book reciters” and the mullas who go around the bazaars preaching. 
—Abdu Vali Akhon, Changchile Bayani [Description of theatrical performances] 
(c. 1905–1910, 1) 
 
4) The seeds for vegetables are taken from the region of the khaqan. 
 —Abdu Vali Akhon, Otyash Bayani [Description of vegetables], (c. 1905–1910, 1) 
 
5) …and becoming victorious, Qublay Khan turned his inquiries to the country of Chin. The 
khaqan of Chin had a history book called Kangjang. It told the history of the khans. 
According to it, in the history of the Khitay people there appeared a descendent of Fung 
named Tay Khufus, and his rule was from Adam, peace be upon him. 
—Mullā Mūsá Sayrāmī, Tārikh-i Hamīdī [The Hamidi history], (1911, 10r) 
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6) In the year 1329 [1911 C.E.], Shentung Khan of Bijin had no children. He consulted with 
his mother, saying, “If I don’t have a son, the business of the khanship will not go well. I 
must adopt a child and educate and teach and make known [to him] the business of the 
khan.” So saying, he finished his advice. In the khan’s yamun [yamen] there was a great 
official who was an intimate. The khan was inclined toward [this official’s] son. 
—Hājjī Ghulām Muḥammad Khān Khwājam, Kāshghar Mā Tīṭaynīng Vāqi ‘asi 
[The events of Kashgar’s Ma Titai] (a continuation of the Tārīkh-i Hamīdī), (1927, 
f. 124v). 
 
Altishahri Impulses: China as Emperor, China as City 
 In these texts, China is defined, above all else, by the emperor, called khan or khaqan.5 In 
his shadow, ethnic and linguistic distinctions, such as Chinese versus Manchu, are invisible.6 He 
is not just the representative of China in all political affairs, but a synecdoche for China as a 
political entity and even as a geographic location. Thus, for Abdu Vali Akhon, China is “the 
region of the khaqan” (khāqān iqlīmi), and in the Taẕkirah of Afaq Khoja, the khaqan of Chin is 
treated like a place, one of several destinations on the saint’s globe-trotting itinerary: Mecca, 
Ferangi (Europe), khaqan of Chin, Sukhur, Sala, Kashgar, Qumul. 
 Such interchangeability of person and place is characteristic of Altishahr’s popular 
historical tradition. As I have argued elsewhere (Thum 2014), in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, history was organized in Altishahr by personages and their associated 
places, rather than, say, chronologically. Local history was a patchwork of hagiographies, 
connected through geographic networks of pilgrimage. Ordinary people learned the histories of 
local saints through travel to shrines, at which the stories of the saints were recited. These stories 
were collected in anthologies that were geographically organized by the locations of the saints’ 
graves. Towns were known by their entombed saints, and saints were known by the towns in 
which they were buried. The identification of China with a single powerful individual, typically 
represented in a caricatured form, fit accounts of China neatly into the Altishahri scheme of 
history. 
 This treatment extended to certain other external societies as well. In another section of 
the Taẕkirah of Āfāq Khvāja, the word “Ferangi” is used both to denote a place (presumably 
somewhere in Europe) and the ruler of the place, who is sometimes called “the padishah of 
Ferangi” and sometimes simply “the Ferangi.” The Qalmaqs (i.e., the Dzungar Mongols), who 
appeared in several of the works above, were more often described as a group of people than the 
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Chinese or Europeans were, but they, too, were frequently represented by their “khan.” Thus, the 
synecdoche of the khaqan for China seems to be an instance of a more general mode of 
imagining foreign powers. 
Altishahri descriptions of China also reflect local understandings of geography, through 
the conflation of city and region. Hājjī Ghulām describes the emperor as the khan of Bijin 
(Beijing), and later in his work refers to the Chinese language as “Bijinche” (Beijingese). 
Another manuscript of the Taẕkirah of Afaq Khoja speaks of Chin Shahar (China city) (LuA2, f. 
36b). This reflects the geographical outlook of an oasis society, just as the name of the region, 
Altishahr, which means “six cities,” does.7 As the name suggests, Altishahr was a collection of 
inhabited places in a matrix of insignificant space—more specifically, oases in the Taklamakan 
Desert. The name of any one of the “six” cities often denoted not just the city but the entire oasis 
in which the city was located. The region was usually described as a series of points on the 
landscape, rather than continuous space. Thus, it is not surprising that Altishahri authors would 
fail to distinguish between city and region, even in the case of the enormous Qing Empire. It is 
even possible that consumers of a text like the Taẕkirah of Afaq Khoja actually imagined the 
khaqan of Chin to be the ruler of an oasis—a particularly distant oasis, with a particularly 
powerful army that allowed it to indirectly control other oases, such as the “six cities,” but in the 
end an oasis just the same. Altishahris imagined China to be similar to their own indigenous 
oasis communities, applying their own geopolitical logic to their conceptualization of this other 
place called “China.” 
In sum, the indigenously authored texts of Altishahr depict China as a place and culture 
synonymous with its khan, and as a city. These characteristics are more or less particular to 
Altishahr, absent from the other networks of significance with which Altishahris engaged. By 
distinguishing these characteristics, I am suggesting that they are markers of a network of shared 
concepts that aligned roughly with the imagined boundaries of Altishahri identity. However, not 
all shared understandings employed in the Altishahri construction of China were limited to the 
region of Altishahr. It would be a mistake to associate those wider networks of meaning with 
Altishahr in particular, and it would be a mistake to let one kind of network—identity in the 
Barthian sense—dominate our explanation of Altishahr’s China (Barth 1994). 
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Wider Networks of Meaning 
The word kāfir (one who does not accept Islam) places our sample texts in a much wider 
network of meaning, embracing nearly all communities that valued the reading of the Quran, 
where the word appears frequently.8 The Altishahri application of the word kāfir to the khaqan of 
Chin could have been understood almost anywhere in the Islamic world, regardless of local 
language differences. Rejection of Islam was the only descriptive characteristic given 
consistently to China across Altishahri authors.9 Usually unbelievers were called kāfir but they 
were occasionally described as idolaters (but parastlār). In addition to the passages already cited, 
kāfir appears frequently throughout both Mullā Bilāl’s and Sayrāmī’s histories, and less 
frequently in the Taẕkirah of Afaq Khoja and Hājjī Ghulām’s history. 
 The reputation of the Chinese as kāfirs made them interchangeable with the Qalmaqs 
(Dzungar Mongols) to a great extent. For example, Sayrāmī described the scheme of an 
Altishahri leader who had captured a Qalmaq enemy of the Qing in language that emphasized the 
interchangeability of Khitay (China/Chinese/Manchus) and Qalmaq: 
 
The arrival of Khitay soldiers in Ili became known. Taking counsel, he decided, 
“If I make a gift of this foul kāfir  [whom I have captured] to the unclean kāfir 
who is coming, is there anything better than this?” and taking him, he set out. 
(Sayrāmī 1911, f. 23r) 
 
Here the Qalmaq and the Khitay are described in almost identical language to highlight their 
interchangeability. A similar attitude appears in Sayrāmī’s personal criticism of the feuding of 
Sufi leaders called “khojas,” whose civil wars led to the domination of Altishahr, first by the 
Dzungars and then by the Qing. He wrote, 
 
Giving themselves the names “White Mountain” and “Black Mountain,” bringing 
misfortune and ruin upon themselves, and being disunited, [the khojas] gave over 
the homeland [yürt] and the people of the homeland to Qalmaqs and Khitays. 
(Sayrāmī 1911, f. 24v) 
 
 The interchangeability of kāfirs probably also facilitated some of the conceptual blurring 
between Chin and Machin and Khitay/Chin/Bijin. If the ancient enemy of Altishahri Muslims 
was not exactly identified with Qing overlords, it was equated with them morally. Both could be 
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essentialized as the outrageous infidel other to the East. Indeed, in Mullā Bilāl’s Holy War in 
China, which describes Muslim rebellions against infidel Qing rule, the Qing Empire is 
sometimes described as “Chin and Machin.” Even though Bilāl’s conflation is an outlier among a 
large body of texts that uphold the distinction, it suggests that connections between the two 
concepts were plausible. Such resonances brought the weight of the popular condemnation of 
“Chin and Machin,” which the taẕkirahs depict as an evil beyond the pale, to bear on the Qing 
Empire. 
While kāfir was a word that could be understood throughout the Islamic world, it is 
important to understand its articulation with particularly Altishahri notions of Muslimness. The 
designation of China and the Qalmaqs as infidels seems at first to represent a hard and distinct 
line between Muslim and non-Muslim, with China firmly on the non-Muslim side. Indeed, these 
texts elsewhere make distinctions between a people called “Khitay,” which includes Chinese and 
Manchu speakers, and the “Tungans,” or Chinese-speaking Muslims. China’s kāfir identity is so 
strong that the people who are today called Muslim Chinese or Sino-Muslims are excluded from 
the Khitay category in Altishahri texts. 
On closer inspection, however, it appears that there are degrees of Muslimness. The 
Tungans are represented as believers; one Tungan, for example, acts as deputy for the saint 
Muḥammad Yūsuf in the Taẕkirah of Afaq Khoja. And yet the Tungans do not share in the full 
Altishahri identity, which is defined by its Muslimness. Thus, when treating the interactions of 
the Tungans and the Altishahris, Mullā Bilāl refers to the language of the Altishahris as 
“Musulmanche” (Muslimese). And the Tungans are not the only believers to be excluded from 
the Muslim designation. In other Altishahri texts, Kirghiz believers are distinguished from “we 
Muslims” (Altishahris) (Kāshgharī c. 1770, f. 50a). The notion of “us” and “Muslim” bleed 
together so fully that, in order to be completely Muslim, one must be Altishahri. At the same 
time, Tungans and Kirghiz believers are never called kāfir. This cautious use of kāfir 
demonstrates some attention to the actual religious status (accepting or rejecting Islam) of those 
to whom it is applied, retaining its basic Quranic meaning in regard to Khitay. At the same time, 
the frequent use of terms of Muslimness to draw boundaries within the community of believers 
suggests that the use of kāfir as a label for China also functioned more generally as an 
Islamicized form of “othering.” 
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The Taẕkirah of Āfāq Khvāja presents further gradations of belief in its many tales of 
conversions. Interestingly, conversion is something that happens to both Muslims and kāfirs and 
always hinges on submission to a charismatic Sufi. Among kāfirs, the Dalai Lama professes faith 
in Islam when Afaq Khoja wins a competition of miraculous powers. The nobles of Tibet then 
ask to profess the faith secretly (makhfī), so as not to upset their subjects. The khaqan of Chin 
himself converts when he is cured of a disease by ingesting the saliva of Afaq’s father, known in 
the text as Mazār Pādishāhim. In the words of the text, “asking what Mazār Pādishāhim’s secret 
was, he accepted the faith [‘aqīda ikhlāṣ qildilar]” (LuAK f. 15r). We are not told whether by 
doing so the khaqan has abandoned unbelief and shaken the description of kāfir that 
characterized him in all earlier and later Altishahri treatments of China. When believers convert, 
they do so “to” Afaq or his father, Mazār Pādishāhim. For example, the text narrates that “all of 
the people in Sālā were Muslims. They converted [inābat qildilar] to Mazār Pādishāhim” (LuAK 
f. 16r). Even followers of Afaq are “converted anew” (yangībāshdin inābat qildilar) to Afaq 
when he conquers Kashgar (LuAK f. 57v). 
These notions of faith reflect the workings of another network of significance, the strain 
of Central Asian Sufism marked by proselytization among rulers. The most famous group in this 
tradition is the Central Asian Naqshbandi order10 best represented in Western Turkestan by the 
political successes of Khoja Ahrar and in Altishahr by the competition between the White and 
Black Mountain khojas for influence with the khan of Yarkand. It was a network that included 
Western Turkestan, Altishahr, Gansu (Western China), and parts of the Tibetan Plateau. The 
notion of conversion promulgated in this network fit only imprecisely with the idea of kāfir 
embedded in the network of Quranic readership, and the notion of Muslimness as it was used 
within the network of Altishahri identity maintenance. The intense competition for ruler-
disciples turned personal loyalty to a particular Sufi leader into a prominent form of religious 
conversion. 
 The words “khan” and “khaqan” mark Altishahri participation in yet another network of 
meaning, one defined by political terminology that spanned the Inner Asian steppes, the settled 
regions of Central Asia, and, in the Qing era, China itself. The Qing emperor himself encouraged 
the use of the term “khan/khaqan,” as part of a program of legitimacy that presented different 
faces to different subjects: the Son of Heaven to the Chinese, the Chakravartin king to the 
Tibetans, and the khan to the Manchus, Mongols, and Altishahris. The term “khan” was also 
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used by Altishahr’s neighbors to the West, the rulers of Khoqand, Bukhara, and Khiva, each of 
whom held the title. This was more than just a shared terminology. It brought with it particular 
understandings of relationships between ruler and subject, which affected the interactions of 
Altishahris and the Chinese state in ways that are explored further below. 
 In Hājjī Ghulām’s text, a third network of significance is visible: the Persian literary 
tradition, which flourished not just in Persia but throughout Central Asia, parts of the Arab world, 
and parts of South Asia. Altishahris copied numerous Persian literary texts and, since the 
beginning of the eighteenth century, translated Persian texts into Turki. Just as importantly, 
professional storytellers mined these texts for tales that would entertain the audiences of public 
places such as the market, telling tales of Persian origin in the local Turki dialect. These were the 
“book reciters” of Abdu Vali Akhon’s text quoted above. 
 The beginning of Hājjī Ghulām’s history is strikingly similar to a common trope of 
Persian storytelling, shared also by the Arabic 1001 Nights, in which the story begins with a 
description of a powerful king who has no son. One such tale begins thus: 
 
There was once, of old time, a king called Shehriman, who was lord of many 
troops and guards and officers and reigned over certain islands, known as the 
Khalidan Islands, on the borders of the land of the Persians; but he was grown old 
and decrepit, without having been blessed with a son, albeit he had four wives, 
daughters of kings, and threescore concubines, with each of whom he was wont to 
lie one night in turn. This preyed upon his mind and disquieted him, so that he 
complained thereof to one of his viziers, saying, “I fear lest my kingdom be lost, 
when I die, for that I have no son to take it after me.”11 
 
The similarities are unmistakable. The use of such an opening in a chronicle breaks with 
Altishahr’s local historical tradition, and it is hard to imagine that Hājjī Ghulām was not strongly 
influenced by the Persian storytelling tradition. Hājjī Ghulām (or his sources) also had to do 
some bending of the facts to make it possible for his history to begin with such a tale. The 
Xuantong emperor (“Shentung,” in Hājjī Ghulām’s text) was five years old at the time of his 
deposition and could hardly have been concerned about sons. Some events described by Ghulām, 
especially the emperor’s poisoning, seem to refer instead to the Guangxu emperor, who died 
three years before the beginning date of Ghulām’s chronicle. The concern over the lack of a son 
better reflects the succession dispute that followed the Tongzhi emperor’s reign (1856–1875), 
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although Guangxu also died without a son. Melding these two or three emperors into a single 
individual allowed for a perfectly typical story opening, and therefore presumably made more 
sense to people who were steeped in the Persian storytelling tradition. 
 Finally, we see in Hājjī Ghulām’s use of the word yamun his participation in a Chinese 
network of significance. This is obviously the Chinese 衙門 (yámén), the term for a local 
administrative compound. Here, Ghulām seems to understand the emperor’s office through his 
local experience of Chinese rule. The emperor’s court would not be called a yamen in Chinese, 
but by Ghulām’s time, the yamen in Kashgar was an important node of China’s colonial power 
in Altishahr, and the most easily accessible model of Chinese administration available to the 
author. 
“China” was thus located at the intersection of religious status and identity through 
Altishahr’s system of ethno-Islamic identity, while its emperor was bound up in the network of 
political relationships of the steppe through the use of the title “khan,” its history was rendered 
by means of shared techniques of the Persian narrative tradition, and its power center was 
understood in terms of the local manifestations of the Qing Empire or Republic of China’s 
bureaucratic power. 
 
Popular “Foreign” Texts on China 
 Altishahris also consumed texts originally composed in other cultural contexts, without 
ever distinguishing such books as foreign. There were no clues in books like the Abu Muslim 
epic or the Alexander romance to reveal their foreign nature, and readers most likely considered 
them indigenous. Certainly such works were deemed just as authoritative as any locally authored 
text.12 
These books were not just read but also rewritten—by copyists. It seems that the effect of 
copying on copyists has not been discussed in scholarship on the world’s various manuscript 
traditions. However, the copyists, who, in the Altishahri case, were often amateurs making 
copies for themselves, did not simply reproduce physical texts. They also formed the words and 
sentences of the texts over again in their thoughts, in their handwriting, and probably also with 
their lips, reinforcing the ideas embedded in the texts in a process quite different from that of 
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reading. They not only consumed, but also recreated, the notions of China that appeared in 
popular “foreign” works. 
Among the most notable of these books were Firdawsī’s Shahnamah and the Alexander 
Romance, which again place the Altishahri “China” in a network of understandings shared by 
readers and writers of Persian literature. Here I will briefly treat the Shahnamah.13 The term 
“khan of Chin” also appears widely in the Shahnamah, but without the blending of person and 
place that is seen in works authored in Altishahr. “Chin” is commonly used alone to indicate a 
large geographical region and a kingdom. The Shahnamah sometimes calls China’s ruler the 
“Faghfur of Chin,” just as Sayrāmī’s history does (Firdawsī 1905, 262).14 The Shahnamah also 
associates Khotan with China through the phrase “Chin and Machin” (Firdawsī 1908, 46, 253, 
265), while maintaining a distinction between the two, as has already been noted. In sum, the 
presence of the Shahnamah in the Altishahri literary and historical canons largely supports the 
notions of China already described, though without displaying the locally significant conflation 
of person and place. 
 
Practical Impact, Past and Present 
The shape of local imaginations of China had practical ramifications. For example, the 
khan-focused imagination of China influenced the way that the rebellions of 1864 unfolded. 
Altishahri witnesses understood the uprising as a rebellion against the khaqan of Chin as an 
individual, attributing the initial rebellion of the Sino-Muslims to outrage over a rumored letter 
from the khaqan himself, which supposedly ordered the massacre of the Sino-Muslims (Sayrāmī 
1911; Bilāl 1880). In the town of Kucha, where the revolt began, rebel crowds asked a former 
beg to become their new khan.15 The former beg refused, out of personal loyalty to the khan, 
using language that reveals a commitment to Inner Asian steppe traditions, of which the khan of 
Chin was supposed to be a participant. Here is part of his speech to the crowd: 
 
How can I wish to do ill [to the khan]? Although he is a kāfir and without religion, 
for generations [my family] has eaten his salt and governed the country. Whatever 
the circumstances may be, I will not betray the lord who has given me salt. 
Maintaining the obligation of salt is obligatory [farẓ wājib] for all people. 
(Sayrāmī 1911, 34a) 
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Applying the “obligation of salt” to the Qing emperor marks the interaction of two networks of 
political discourse. The “obligation of salt” describes the moral duties of a vassal, especially to 
his khan, and is found throughout the Turkic world (Elçin 1966; Hamada 2001, 56). The concept 
is not, however, encountered in the political discourse of the Qing court or the Manchus in 
general. The Altishahri view of China-based rule as the rule of the khan activated the “obligation 
of salt” for the beg. It is hard to imagine that the “obligation of salt” would carry such weight if 
the Altishahris had viewed the Qing ruler through Chinese concepts such as huangdi (emperor) 
or “Son of Heaven.” 
The former beg’s speech also highlights the contradictions inherent in the overlapping 
networks of meaning deployed to describe China. It demonstrates the beg’s awareness that his 
decision was open to attack by opponents engaging the Quranic network of shared cultural 
meanings. Arguments based on the Quranic kāfir were particularly dangerous, because the 
exploitation of the Quranic network could draw in actors apart from the Inner Asian and Turkic 
networks of political concepts. It held the potential to appeal to the Sino-Muslims (Tungans), 
who had begun the Kucha revolt and who had little awareness of the particular forms of loyalty 
due a “khaqan.” While the notion of loyalty itself would hardly have been alien, an argument 
structured around the phrase “obligation of salt” was far less powerful for those outside the 
political discourse of Turkic Inner Asia. In the end, the crowd, which consisted of both Sino-
Muslims and Altishahris (“Tungans and Muslims”), was unconvinced, and the beg lost his life. 
Here it is important to see the use of kāfir not as an Islamic influence, brought to Altishahr with 
Qarakhanid Islamicizing conquests of the eleventh century, but as an engagement with a network 
that still spanned geographies, states, languages, and identity groups, as did the obligation of salt. 
 The Altishahri conception of China as khan/khaqan also casts Qing attitudes toward its 
newest colony in a new light. The prevalence of the term “khan” meant that even before the Qing 
conquest, Altishahris shared a system of political legitimation with the Qing court, as the 
Manchus also conceived of their ruler as khan. Altishahr’s own lineage of khans had been 
extinguished in the late seventeenth century. Thus, after the elimination of the Dzungars, the 
Qing had no competitors in Altishahr for the status of “khan,” the highest political position in the 
Inner Asian and Central Asian worlds. Indeed, as Nathan Light has noted, Sayrāmī endeavored 
in his history (1911) to show that the Qing emperor was a legitimate successor to the Chinggisid 
khanship (Light 2012, 169). 
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It has been noted before that the Qing invested less in tailoring its politico-religious 
discourse to Altishahris than it did for other major conquered groups like the Tibetans and 
Mongols (Rawski 1998). This is less remarkable when we consider that the Altishahris and the 
Manchus were members of the same network of political significance. The Qing simply did not 
need to make a big investment in convincing Altishahris of its temporal legitimacy. However, 
this does not fully explain the lack of Qing ideological attention to Altishahr. The Mongols also 
shared a network of political legitimation with the Manchus, and the Qing worked hard to 
present the emperor as a patron of Mongol religion and politics. Perhaps the Mongols’ military 
might earned this attention. However, even if the Altishahris were more distant and militarily 
weaker, the dangers of ideological disconnects were often demonstrated in open revolts. The 
Qing neglect of the Islamic network to which Altishahris also belonged frequently created crises 
of legitimacy, as rebels presented themselves as holy warriors fighting an infidel enemy. This 
does not, however, overshadow the fact that China was consistently imagined in Altishahr as the 
khan himself, without any dispute over the Chinese emperor’s right to such a title. This 
consistent acceptance of the Qing ruler’s temporal (but certainly not religious) legitimacy 
suggests that Qing ideological programs were more successful in Altishahr than previously 
thought, and therefore that the Qing court’s limited efforts at legitimation were not necessarily as 
tepid as previously supposed. 
Altishahri notions of China hold lessons for today’s policy makers as well. As has been 
demonstrated, Altishahris’ ideas of Islamic identity were shaped by their participation in multiple 
networks of significance. Conversion, Muslimness, and faith could therefore variously indicate 
allegiance to a charismatic Sufi preacher, membership in the Altishahri identity group, or 
acceptance of the Islam of the Quran. Today, Uyghurs often express anti-Chinese feelings in 
terms of belief or Muslimness. It is not rare to hear a Han Chinese person called a kāfir, and it is 
common to hear Uyghurs define themselves first and foremost as “Muslims.” The latter term in 
particular should be seen as an ethnic term as much as a religious term. If policy makers can be 
made aware of the role of these terms in othering and identity maintenance and recognize that 
Uyghurs draw on multiple notions of belief and Muslimness, perhaps it would be possible to 
avoid distorting uses of the labels “fundamentalism” and “religious extremism.” These last terms 
allow the Chinese government not only to ignore the very real grievances of ordinary Uyghurs 
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but also to gain the complicity of other governments in the “strike hard” campaigns that define 
Beijing’s approach to its colony in Xinjiang. 
 It is also important that all Altishahri mentions of China assume China to be an external, 
even distant, entity. Although Altishahr had been incorporated into the Qing Empire for 150 
years by the time of Abdu Vali Akhon, that author still wrote about China, the “region of the 
khaqan,” as a distant place that did not include Altishahr. According to Abdu Vali Akhon, 
vegetable seeds were brought from the region of the khaqan to Altishahr. This is not an 
exceptional text. No Altishahri text describes any part of Altishahr as a part of China in its own 
day.16 Although it was known that the Altishahri begs were vassals of the khaqan, their territory 
was not considered part of the “region of the khaqan.” Despite the growing strength of the 
nation-state concept among Uyghurs over the last eighty years, the incorporation of Altishahr 
into the Chinese state still has not fully eliminated the Uyghur sense that China is a distant 
“other.” Simply put, many Uyghurs do not consider themselves to be a part of China, and this 
understanding is not the product of a newly arrived nationalism. It is rooted in long-standing 
traditions shaped by the networks of meaning described above. 
 
What Does This Tell Us about the Notion of China? 
 A deeper diachronic view of notions of China in Turkestan reveals a remarkable 
continuity. The phrase “khaqan of Chin” is at least as old as the Shahnamah (tenth century A.D.) 
and has served as an anchor for the alternate terms “Khitay” and “Ṣīn.”17 On the one hand, this 
view lends some credibility to the notion of China as a continuous entity. Surprisingly, it seems 
that Altishahr’s inhabitants had a concept of China as one stable historical unit among many (to 
include, for example, Sukhur [Tibet] and Ferangi [Europe]), before Chinese authors ever 
elaborated such an idea.18 The Altishahri belief in “China” suggests that there is a Eurasian 
consensus on the existence of a durable cultural-political center of gravity by that name. At the 
same time, it is necessary to take seriously not only this Eurasian consensus but also Altishahr’s 
particular construction of China. Doing so lends strength to a notion already common among 
non-Chinese scholars—the idea of “China proper”—for the Altishahri view did not consider 
Altishahr as a proper component of China, despite its incorporation into the Qing Empire. 
 The Altishahri case also reminds us of the cultural filters at work in our own concepts of 
China. The practical power of the word “khan” warns us of the ideological baggage that our own 
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word “emperor” carries. It is hard to understand the “obligation of salt” when we are talking 
about an emperor, rather than a khan, and the sacrifice to heaven makes less sense for an 
emperor than for the Son of Heaven. This is, of course, nothing new, but it is interesting to see its 
effects from another cultural perspective. Our notion of China is also attached to our concepts of 
geography. The common emphasis on territory in defining China is encouraged not just by the 
current dominance of nationalist thought but also by the shared Chinese and Western emphasis 
on continuous, regular space, as opposed to the point- or place-based understanding that 
prevailed in Altishahr and expressed itself in the conception of China as a city. 
 
Conclusion 
 The question “what is China?” lies at the center of any serious longue durée study of 
Chinese history, and the answers that scholars have offered have been vital to the destabilization 
of venerable myths and distortions. Not surprisingly, the thread that runs through all these 
answers is that “China” is a construction, a notion best expressed in Haun Saussy’s description of 
China as an “artwork whose medium is history” (Saussy 1993, 151). Historians must admit, as 
they often do, that this work of art is the primary justification for considering either the various 
societies that have existed on the territory of what is now the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
or the various states that appear in the twenty-four standard histories to constitute a single, 
distinctive, and ontologically continuous entity. But whose artwork is this? The obvious (and 
paradoxical) answer is that it is China’s artwork. However, Chinese historians have benefited 
from a growing number of collaborators in the last few centuries. Despite the ideological 
imperatives of PRC scholarship, Chinese history as produced over the last fifty years has been 
very much a product of a conversation among European, American, Japanese, and Chinese 
historians. In taking up, broadly, the dynastic narrative of the twenty-four histories of the 
imperial historiographical tradition,19 Western and Japanese historians have turned the local 
Chinese construction of China into a globally deployed paradigm. Even in studies that emphasize 
the constructedness of “China” or dispense with the dynastic model, the historical artwork of 
China defines the object of study. Indeed, the informed, even reluctant, acceptance of China as 
the object of study is the norm, present in everything from introductory works (e.g., Mitter 2008) 
to specialized monographs (e.g., Di Cosmo 2004). 
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 Tying the notion of “China” to particular cultures—Chinese, Japanese, European, 
American—undermines the presumed universal validity of the China concept, but it also requires 
us to ask the question: are there other such artworks called China? This article has pieced 
together one alternative construction of China from a society viewed as marginal by its China-
based conquerors and colonizers: Altishahr in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. If 
retrospective historical constructions are to define the Sinologist’s object of study, then we 
should be familiar with the variety of such constructions that exist and have existed. Ironically, 
this may even lend plausibility to the notion of “China,” by revealing a cross-cultural consensus 
on the existence of a cultural-political center of gravity on the eastern end of Asia. At the same 
time, it calls our own notion of China into question by making its cultural specificity obvious. 
 An examination of Altishahri notions of China is also useful for understanding the 
relationship between Islam and China. The Altishahri case shows that any examination of this 
relationship must engage multiple overlapping systems of meaning, not simply 
nation/civilization and religion. To emphasize the effect of a focus on overlapping networks of 
significance, I have (somewhat unnaturally) avoided tracing the origins of the various elements 
that together shaped the Altishahri “China.” I have explored the grammar of these elements 
rather than their etymology, and mapped the geographic and cultural territory of their currency. 
The etymological approach is, of course, also an indispensible line of historical inquiry. It is 
worth knowing that the sonless king trope can be traced through Persia to India, and the term 
“khan” to the northeasternmost corner of the Inner Asian steppe over two millennia ago. Such 
knowledge alerts us to lost meanings and associated traditions that were present in the context of 
origin. It also allows us to tell the stories of how various networks of meaning grew and changed 
over time. 
But etymological investigation, when overly emphasized, can distort our understanding 
of the past. It captures only a one-time, unidirectional influence, and it does so teleologically. It 
hides the continuing exchanges encouraged by shared ways of meaning. It masks the ability of a 
Persian merchant to understand an Altishahri history of China, of a Gansu Chinese Muslim to see 
belief as loyalty to Afaq Khoja (and to make a pilgrimage to his tomb in Altishahr), or of a 
Kazakh herder to share the Altishahri view of the Chinese emperor as khaqan. When such 
interactions do appear in the etymological approach, they are seen as cross-cultural, rather than 
intra-network, exchanges. Attention to the grammar of wider networks of significance captures 
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these continuing interactions and accounts better for the intense sharing of cultural material that 
has characterized Eurasia for two millennia. It also allows us to see culture as a vast series of 
overlapping networks of shared meanings that defy boundary drawing, rather than bounded, 
essentialized puzzle pieces. We can then leave it to the individual participants in these networks 
to draw the conceptual boundaries that create identity groups, without letting those boundaries 
blind us to exchanges that continue across imagined borders. 
The etymological approach also lends itself to the continued positing of idealized, pure, 
cultural units. For periods after the Tang dynasty, the pure, Islam-free China and the pure, China-
free Islam can be sustained as relevant ideas only if we continually look back to that very brief 
period between the time of the Prophet Muhammad and the arrival of the first Muslims in China. 
Etymological studies do just that, maintaining the fiction of pure, mutually exclusive China and 
Islam by tracing connections to a time when such pure units are supposed to have existed. As 
such, etymology is the engine of the syncretism model that is so prominent in the study of Islam 
and China. No matter how absurd it may be to conceive of China as essentially non-Islamic after 
thirteen hundred years of Muslim presence in China, one can always recuperate the notion of a 
pure, Islam-free China by tracing Islam back in time to its non-Chinese origins, and China back 
to its pre-Islamic existence. 
The importance of so many overlapping networks of meaning to Altishahri 
understandings of Islam and China also invites us to examine closely the phrase “Islam in China.” 
This phrase has come to define a small academic field, and yet we have scarcely considered its 
implications or how it shapes our inquiries. “Islam in China” confronts us with the odd 
juxtaposition of a global complex of religious traditions and a nation, subsuming the former 
under the latter. It elevates these two categories of analysis above others, such as class, scholarly 
networks, literary traditions, foodways, and genealogies, and it leads scholars to imagine the 
development of Islamic traditions in terms of unidirectional “influences” and “syncretism” rather 
than overlapping networks of meaning and exchange. Ironically, it also imposes a mental 
segregation of China and Islam. It leaves room for exotic Muslim minorities in China, and also 
Chinese Muslims, but the “real” China is assumed to remain largely untainted by Islam, and the 
“real” (nonsyncretic) Islam untainted by Chinese cultures. Muslims in China are treated as 
though they had compromised their claims to full participation in either of these larger identities. 
We have circumscribed them to keep Islam and China distinct. We can see the effectiveness of 
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this segregation by observing how strange it seems to speak of “China’s Islamicness” or “Islam’s 
Chineseness.” There are Muslims in China, but somehow China escapes being Islamic. Apart 
from studies of “syncretic” or “mixed” forms, no one has yet asked how Islam, as a global 
phenomenon, has been Chinese. In such an environment, even an inversion of the common 
phrase “Islam in China” is uncomfortable. 
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Notes 
 
1 This is an assumption shared with lay English usage of the word “China,” but one that, as 
the New Qing Historians have demonstrated, does not withstand close scrutiny. The work 
of Rawski (1998), Elliott (2001), Crossley (2002), and many others has shown that China 
was treated by its Qing rulers as one among several components of the Manchu-ruled 
Qing Empire. 
2 “The region [kishwar] of Chin” (LuMK, f. 26b) and “Chin city” (Hajji c. 1700–1849, f. 
86a). 
3 Inscription from the interior of the tomb of Muhammad Sharīf in Yarkand. The 
translation comes from Brophy and Thum (forthcoming). 
4 This list is not exhaustive. In particular, I have not been able to consult several unique 
manuscripts treating the history of the 1864 rebellions. 
5 Elsewhere, Mullā Bilāl also calls him “shah of Chin and Machin.” 
6 Such distinctions never appear in any Altishahri texts. 
7 The number was conventional. There were more than six cities, and there was no 
agreement on which of them were the six referred to by the word Altishahr. 
8 It appears twenty-six times as a simple noun with the meaning of “infidel” and many 
more times in verbal and other forms. 
9 Tyranny (ẓulm) is also mentioned in several works, but it is often applied to specific 
periods or situations and is not applied with the universality of unbelief. 
10 For a non-Naqshbandi representative of this tradition, see Muhammad Sharīf, a saint 
whose status has been the subject of much study (Baldick 1993; DeWeese 1996; 
DeWeese 2011). 
11 Payne’s 1901 translation of the tale of “Kemerezzeman and Budour” (100). The trope 
also appears in the story of “Ma’ruf the Treasure Seeker.” For another example, see the 
Sindibādnāma. W. A Clouston calls this trope the “‘regulation’ opening of by far the 
greater number of Asiatic stories” and considers it a sign of Indian origins (Clouston 
1887, 576). 
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12 For a colorful demonstration of the Alexander Romance’s perceived veracity, see the 
marginal note in Iskandarnāmah (Manuscript # Prov 324, Jarring Collection), which says, 
“This is the Iskandarnāmah, whoever should say it is a lie, his mouth shall be filled with 
sheep droppings” (f. 46a). More pertinently, the few Altishahri texts that record textual 
sources make no distinction between local and foreign works. 
13 The Shahnamah is particularly useful because it combined relatively wide circulation 
with extensive treatment of China. 
14 On the connections of this title to the Parthian Pahlavi baghpuhr (son of God) and the 
Sogdian baghpūr, see Bearman et al. (2014). For the title on a Kushan inscription, see 
Maricq (1958). 
15 This is a sign of how successfully the begs maintained their own legitimacy as Islamic 
rulers, even while serving an infidel khan. 
16 In certain cases of conflation of “Chin and Machin” with Qing China, Khotan might be 
seen as a former part of China. 
17 Cīna, as is well known, is much older, perhaps traceable to the Qin dynasty. 
18 Ironically, after such an idea was articulated within China in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, the continuity of an essential China became a tool of the People’s 
Republic of China for the domination of the Uyghurs, whose land is now considered “an 
inseparable part of our great motherland” (Dong and Jiang 1991, 13).  
19 In the sense that anything treated as “us” in the twenty-four histories is considered to be 
China. 
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